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INTRODUCTION

The doctrine of privity of contract applies to situations in which
one of the parties to an agreement has undertaken to confer a
benefit on a third party. For example, A and B may enter into a
contract where, in return for services provided to A by B, A
promises to pay money to C. For convenience we shall refer to A
as the promisor, to B, the party who gives consideration to the
promisor, as the promisee, and to C as the third-party beneficiary.
According to the doctrine of privity, C has no standing to enforce
A's undertaking. C is a mere third-party beneficiary of A's undertaking and therefore not truly a party to the agreement. As has
been explained, "only a person who is a party to a contract can sue
on it".I
It is true, of course, that if A breaches his undertaking to pay C,
B could bring an action for damages for breach of contract. This
prospect may provide only cold comfort for C, however, for two
reasons. First, in many third-party beneficiary cases, B will have
sustained no real loss as a result of A's nonperformance. Although
the point is not free from difficulty,2 it appears that where this is so,
1. Dunlop Pneumatic Tire Co. v. Selfridge & Co., [1915] A.C. 847 (H.L.) at p. 853.
2. Contrast West v. Houghton (1879), 4 C.P.D. 197 (P.C.) with Lloyd's v. Harper (1880), 16
Ch. D. 290 (C.A.) at p. 321 per Lush L.J. In Beswick v. Beswick, [1968] A.C. 58 (H.L.),

for example, specific performance was awarded to the plaintiff in order to avoid, it would
appear, resolving the question of whether C's damage might be merely nominal because
A's breach caused no loss to B. See idem at pp. 72-73, Lord Reid and pp. 88-89, Lord
Pearce. See also Coulls v. Bagot's Executor & Trustee Co. Ltd. (1967), 119 C.L.R. 460
(Aust. H.C.) at pp. 501-02 per Windeyer J. And see Panatown Ltd. v. Alfred McAlpine
ConstructionLtd., [2000] 4 All E.R. 97 (H.L.). For analysis, see G.H. Treitel, "Damages
in Respect of aThird Party's Loss" (1998), 114 L.Q.R. 527; B. Coote, "he Performance
Interest, Panatown, and the Problem of Loss" (2001), 117 L.Q.R. 81.
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B's claim would likely result in the recovery of only nominal damages. Second, quite apart from remedies issues, it may well be that
B is unlikely to bring an action of this kind. B may be uninterested
or may have disappeared. B may have no financial incentive for
bearing the cost of a lawsuit that might redound only to the benefit
of C. In many cases, then, the third-party beneficiary rule will leave
the third party without any effective redress against the person who
promised, for good consideration, to confer a benefit on the third
party.
The third-party beneficiary rule is potentially applicable in a
number of commonplace transactional patterns. The phenomenon
of agreements in which the promisor undertakes to pay money to
the third-party beneficiary has been referred to above. In some
instances of this kind, the intention of the promisee may be to
confer a gift on the third-party beneficiary. In others, the promisee's intent may be to ensure a discharge of a pre-existing debt
owed by a promisee to the third-party beneficiary. Many insurance
contracts may give rise to third-party beneficiary issues. Insurance
contracts often impose obligations on the insurer to pay money to
a third-party beneficiary in certain defined circumstances. The
distribution of manufactured goods through the common pattern
of a manufacturer selling goods to a dealer who sells, in turn, to a
consumer may give rise to similar problems. If the manufacturer
includes, in its contract of sale with the dealer, a manufacturer's
guarantee that is intended to benefit the ultimate consumer, the
consumer will be a third-party beneficiary of that guarantee.
Similar problems may arise in the context of building contracts.
In the typical pattern, the owner of land hires a general contractor
to construct a building. In turn, the general contractor will hire
subcontractors to supply goods and services of various kinds. The
owner would be a mere third-party beneficiary of the promises
given by the subcontractors in their agreements with the general
contractor. Another possibility arising in this context results from
the common practice of owners requiring contractors to ensure
that they will pay their subcontractors by purchasing a performance bond under which a surety guarantees that the subcontractors will be paid. The subcontractors are third-party beneficiaries
of arrangements of this kind.
Provisions of agreements that are designed to limit the liability
of one of the parties to the agreement may also be drafted with a
view to restricting the liability of third parties. Thus a shipper of
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goods might agree with the carrier that the carrier's liability for
damage to the goods may be restricted to some degree and, further,

that the restriction will be applicable also to the potential liability
of the carrier's employees and any independent contractors, such
as stevedores, whom the carrier might hire to handle the goods.
The carrier's employees and the stevedores would be third-party

beneficiaries of such a provision.
Although, as we shall see, the courts and legislatures have

developed techniques for providing relief to third-party beneficiaries in some of these situations, the general principle to the effect
that the third-party beneficiary has no right to enforce the undertak-

ing of the promisor is clearly established. The doctrine is capable
of producing much mischief, however, and accordingly, it has been
the subject of much criticism. The doctrine has been subjected to
trenchant criticism by judges in England, 3 Canada,4 and Australia.5
Frequent calls for reform are made in reports of various law reform
agencies. 6 A number of Commonwealth jurisdictions,7 including one

Canadian province, New Brunswick,' and most recently, the United

Kingdom,9 have abrogated the rule by statute. The unsatisfactory
nature of the traditional Anglo-Canadian rule can be contrasted with

the approach taken in other jurisdictions. Third-party beneficiaries
3. See, for example, Woodar Investment Development Ltd v. Wimpey Construction U.K.
Ltd., [1980] 1 W.L.R. 277 (H.L.) at p. 291 per Lord Salmon and at p. 300 per Lord
Scarman; Darlington Borough Council v. Wiltshier Northern Ltd., [1995] 1 W.L.R. 68
and White v. Jones, [1995] 2 A.C. 207 (H.L.) at pp. 262-63
(C.A.) at p. 76 per Steyn L.J.;
per Lord Goff.
4. London Drugs Ltd. v. Kuehne & Nagel InternationalLtd., [1992] 3 S.C.R. 299 at pp. 41826, [1993] 1 W.W.R. 1, 97 D.L.R. (4th) 261 per lacobucci J. For discussion, see M.
Baer, "Case Comment" (1993), 72 Can. Bar Rev. 385 and N. Siebrasse, "Third Party
Beneficiaries in the Supreme Court: Categorization and the Interpretation of Ambiguous
Contracts" (1995), 45 U.T.L.J. 47.
5. Trident General Insurance Co. Ltd v. McNiece Bros. Ply.Ltd. (1988), 165 C.L.R. 107 at
pp. 116-24 per Mason C.J. and pp. 169-72 per Toohey J.
6. See, for example, Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Amendment of the Law
of Contract (Toronto, Ministry of the Attorney General, 1987); Manitoba Law Reform
Commission, Privityof Contract(Winnipeg, Law Reform Commission, 1993); and U.K.
Law Commission, "Privity of Contract: Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties Cm
3329 in Law Commission No. 242 (London: H.M.S.O., 1996).
7. New Zealand, Queensland, and Westem Australia. See U.K. Law Commission, ibid., at
pp. 55-62.
8. Law Reform Act, S.N.B. 1993, c. L-1.2, s. 4.
9. Contracts (Rights ofThird Parties) Act (U.K.) 1999, c. 31. Fordiscussion, see C. MacMilIan, "A. Birthday Present for Lord Denning: The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act
1999" (2000), 63 Mod. L. Rev. 721 (the title alluding to the fact that upon second reading
of the bill in the House of Lords, a colleague "presented" the bill to Lord Denning, a
persistent critic of the doctrine, as a gift in celebration of his hundredth birthday).
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have been accorded the right to enforce promises for their benefit in
American law."0 Further, as Viscount Haldane noted in the Dunlop
case, the rule knows no parallel in a number of civilian jurisdictions." In common law Canada, apart from New Brunswick, the
general rule has survived nonetheless. As we shall see, however, the
force of the rule has been significantly undermined by two recent
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, London Drugs Ltd. v.
Kuehne & Nagel International Ltd. 2 and Fraser River Pile &
Dredge Ltd. v. Can-Dive Services Ltd. 3 In these decisions, the court
resisted the temptation to overrule the general privity of contract
doctrine but developed a new exception to the general rule that
enabled the court to withhold application of the doctrine in each
case.

This article attempts to provide, in Part B, an account of the
current status of the doctrine of privity of contract in Canadian
common law. More particularly, the article attempts to assess the
ramifications for the doctrine of these two decisions. The article
then attempts to make the case, in Part C, for outright abolition of
the doctrine and, more particularly, for abolition of the doctrine
through judicial reform.
B. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE DOCTRINE IN CANADA

I. Development and Rationale of the Rule
Although there is some evidence in 17th- and 18th-century
authorities of a judicial willingness to admit claims by third-party
beneficiaries, 4 a rule to the contrary was clearly adopted in 1861 in
Tweddle v. Atkinson 5 and, more importantly, reaffirmed by the
House of Lords in 1915 in Dunlop, 6 in 1962 in Scruttons Ltd. v.
Midland Silicones Ltd., 7 and by numerous Canadian decisions. I In
Tweddle, the father of a bride exchanged promises with the father of
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

See generally, M. Eisenberg, "'Third Party Beneficiaries" (1992), 92 Col. L. Rev. 1358.
Supra, footnote I, at p. 853.
Supra, footnote 4.
(1999), 176 D.L.R. (4th) 257, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 108.
See generally R. Flannigan, "Privity - the End of an Era (Error)" (1987), 103 L.Q.R.
564.
(1861), 1 B. & S.393, 121 E.R. 762 (Q.B.) (cited to E.R.).
Supra, footnote 1.
[1962] A.C. 446.
See, for example, Canadian General Electric Co. v. Pickford & Black Ltd., [1971]
S.C.R. 41, 14 D.L.R. (3d) 372 and Greenwood Shopping PlazaLtd. v. Neil J. Buchanan
Ltd., [1980] 2 S.C.R. 228, 11 D.L.R. (3d) 257.
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the groom that they each would pay moneys to the groom before a
certain date. After the wedding, they recorded these promises in a
writing, which was assented to and ratified by the married couple.
The agreement further stipulated that the husband was to have full
power to sue either of the parties with respect to the enforcement of
these promises. In the claim eventually brought against his fatherin-law, however, the husband was unsuccessful on the ground that
he was a "stranger to the consideration" and was not a "party" to the
contract.' 9
The facts of the Dunlop case involved what would now be called
a resale price maintenance scheme.2' It was designed to operate in
the following fashion. The plaintiff tire manufacturer, Dunlop,
wished to ensure that retailers who sold their tires would not do so
at prices below the manufacturer's list price. As is often the case,
however, the manufacturer did not deal directly with retailers, but
rather distributed their tires by selling them to its wholesale merchant who, in turn, sold the tires to retailers. In its contract with its
wholesaler, Dew & Co., Dunlop provided an incentive for Dew to
obtain, in its contracts with retailers, an undertaking that the retailers
would observe the manufacturer's list price when dealing with their
own customers. Breach of the undertaking would render the retailer
to pay £5 per sale directly to Dunlop. If Dew extracted such an
undertaking from a retailer, Dew was entitled to sell the tires to that
retailer at 10% below the list price. Dew had, in fact, obtained such
an undertaking in its contract with the defendant Selfridge & Co.,
but the latter failed to live up to the agreement and sold two tires to
its customers at less than the list price. Dunlop then brought an
action to enforce Selfridge's undertaking and recover £ 10. The claim
was defeated by the third-party beneficiary rule. The undertaking
had been given to Selfridge in its contract with Dew. Dunlop was a
mere third-party beneficiary of that promise.
In explaining the decision, Viscount Haldane repeated what are
often thought to be two separate justifications for the privity doctrine alluded to in the Tweddle case and described them as "fundamental" principles of English law. First, "only a person who is a
19. Supra, footnote 15, at p. 764. The court rejected the suggestion that an exception
obtained where the promisee was a parent of the third-party beneficiary, thereby dismissing the potential applicability of Dutton and Wife v. Poole (1678), 2 Lev. 210.
20. Now rendered illegal in Canada by the Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1985,
c. C-34, s. 38. See, generally, M. Trebilcock, D. McQueen and B. Dunlop, Canadian

Competition Policy (Aurora, Ont., Canada Law Book, 1987).
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party to a contract can sue on it".21 Second, if a person is to be able
to enforce a contract, "consideration must have been given by him
to the promisor".22 Dunlop had entered into a contract of purchase
and sale with Dew and did not itself either enter into a contract with
Selfridge or provide consideration to it for Selfridge's undertaking
to observe the list price. Although Lord Dunedin confessed that "this
case is to my mind apt to nip any budding affection which one might
have had for the doctrine of consideration",' he was nonetheless
confidently of the view that the privity doctrine was a well established feature of English law.
The justifications offered for the privity doctrine in these cases
are quite unconvincing.24 The first explanation is that the third-party
beneficiary is not a "party" to the agreement. It is not entirely
clear what is meant by this notion and how this concept can be
distinguished, if at all, from the requirement that only a party who
has given consideration to the promisor can enforce a promise. In
Tweddle,25 for example, the son-in-law was not only named in the
agreement expressly as the person to whom the payments were to
be made, he also explicitly assented to and ratified the arrangement.
Nonetheless, he is said not to be a "party" to the agreement. It is not
entirely clear, then, what content can be given to the concept of
being a party other than the requirement that in order to be a
party in the requisite sense, one must have given consideration to a
promisor. If there is any independent content to the notion of "party"
in this context, it would appear to be a mere circularity of reasoning.
One is not a party because a third-party beneficiary is not a party.
The suggestion that the privity doctrine simply flows from or is
somehow deducible from the doctrine of consideration is also
seriously flawed. The doctrine of consideration performs the role
of determining whether a particular promise should be considered
to be legally binding. It is a test for the enforceability of promises.
The doctrine, in its own terms at least, says nothing with respect to
26
the question of who should be able to enforce a binding promise.
Indeed, it might be suggested that the privity doctrine is inconsistent
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Supra, footnote 1, at p. 853.
Ibid.
Ibid., at p. 855.
See Eisenberg, supra, footnote 10.
Supra, footnote 15.
See Eisenberg, supra, footnote 10. See further, infra, the text at footnotes 109-113.
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with consideration theory inasmuch as it will lead, in many situations, to the perverse result that a promise given for good consideration will be essentially unenforceable for all practical purposes.
Lord Denning championed judicial reform of the rule on a
number of occasions,27 but his attempts to overrule the doctrine in a
general manner did not enjoy success. In Beswick v. Beswick,28 for
example, he mounted a persuasive attack on the rule in a case where
a deceased person had, while living, sold his business to a nephew
who promised in return that after the uncle's death the nephew
would pay his widow an annuity of £5 per week. The uncle died and
the nephew refused to pay the annuity. Lord Denning would have
allowed the widow's direct claim to enforce the nephew's promise
on the ground that the third-party beneficiary rule is not commanded
by earlier authority and would lead to an unattractive result. The
other two members of the Court of Appeal,29 however, justified a
decision in the widow's favour on the basis that she had also sued
the nephew in her capacity as administratrix of her husband's estate.
In their view, she was entitled to succeed in that capacity and indeed
should be granted a decree of specific performance ordering the
nephew to make the payments to her. On appeal to the House of
Lords, the latter view prevailed.3" Their Lordships were unanimous
in rejecting Lord Denning's approach and reaffirming the commonly
accepted view that the third-party beneficiary rule is good law.
Though there was some hesitancy on the question of whether the
estate was entitled only to nominal damages, 3 the court was also
unanimously of the view that the estate was entitled to a decree of a
specific performance.
In cases like Beswick, judicial reaffirmation of the traditional
rule is often accompanied by an acknowledgement of its unsatisfactory nature. In Beswick, for example, Lord Reid observed that
a strong Law Revision Committee had recommended statutory
overruling of the doctrine 30 years before, in 1937.32 He then
suggested that "if one had to contemplate a further long period of
Parliamentary procrastination, this House might find it necessary to
27. See, for example, Smith & Snipes Hall Farm v. River Douglas Catchment Board, [ 1949]
2 K.B. 500 (C.A.) and White v. John Wanvick & Co. Ltd., [1953] 1 W.L.R. 1285 (C.A.).

28. [1966] 1 Ch. 538 (C.A.), affd supra, footnote 2.
29. Danckwerts and Salmon L.JJ.
30. See supra, footnote 2.

31. See ibid.
32. See ibid. at p. 72, referring to U.K. Law Revision Committee, Cmd 5449 in Sixth Interim
Report, Statute ofFrauds and the Doctrine of Consideration (London, H.M.S.O., 1937).
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deal with this matter".33 Similarly, in the recent decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in London Drugs,34 Iacobucci J., writing
for a majority of the court, rehearsed many of the standard criticisms
of the doctrine in pithy fashion and acknowledged "strong reservations about the rigid retention of a doctrine that has undergone
systematic and substantial attack".35 It was nonetheless his view that
major reform to such an established principle of the law of contracts
must come from the legislature.36
After the passage of more than 30 years since the decision in
Beswick, reforming legislation has been enacted in the United
Kingdom. 7 In Canada, however, no legislative solution has been
forthcoming and the path of judicial reform to date has adopted the
strategy of carving out exceptions to the general rule. We turn, then,
to a consideration of the various means by which application of the
rule can be avoided in particular fact situations through adoption of
other analytical devices or through the application of exceptions to
the rule itself.
II. Limitations on and Exceptions to the Rule
Application of the third party beneficiary rule can be avoided if
other doctrines, such as agency, trust, collateral contract or tort
provide a foundation for a claim by the beneficiary against the
promisor. As well, there are recognized exceptions to the doctrine,
both statutory and at common law, that ameliorate the harsh consequences of the rule in particular circumstances.
1. Agency
Under the principles of the law of agency, where a principal
authorizes an agent to enter into contracts on the principal's behalf
with third parties, the result of the agent's doing so is that the
principal has a direct contractual relationship with the third party.3"
In what appears to be a third-party beneficiary case, then, it might
be successfully argued that the promisee, B, was acting as an agent
33. Supra, footnote 2, at p. 72. And see the authorities cited in footnote 3, supra.
34. Supra, footnote 4.
35. Ibid, at p. 437.

36. See ibid. at p. 439.
37. Supra, footnote 9.
38. See generally G.H.L. Fridman, The Law of Agency, 7th ed. (Toronto, Butterworths,
1996) and R. Powell, The Law ofAgency, 2nd ed. (London, Pitman & Sons, 1961).
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on behalf of C, the third-party beneficiary, in extracting a promise
from A to confer a benefit on C. C, then, would have a direct
contractual relationship with A and the third-party beneficiary rule
would be avoided. From time to time, this agency analysis has
been applied to what might otherwise appear to be a third-party
beneficiary case. In McCannell v. Mabee McLaren Motors Ltd.,"
for example, a dispute arose in the context of a series of agreements
entered into by the manufacturer of Studebaker cars and each of its
Canadian dealers. In each agreement with a dealer, the manufacturer
required the dealer to, in effect, respect the territories assigned to
other dealers, and provided for remedies for breach of this undertaking. The provision also stipulated that "[i]t is understood and agreed
that this paragraph shall be construed as an agreement between
dealer and all other Studebaker Dealers who have signed a similar
agreement".4" When one dealer sued another for breach of this
agreement, the court held that with respect to this provision, the
manufacturer acted as the agent of the several dealers to bring
about privity of contract amongst them. Through the agency of the
manufacturer, then, each dealer had entered into a contract with
every other dealer concerning this matter.4"
A similar approach was taken by the Privy Council in New
Zealand Shipping Co. Ltd. v. A.M. Satterthwaite & Co. Ltd.,42 a

case concerning a sale of equipment to be carried by sea to the
purchaser. The seller, as the consignor or sender of the goods,
entered into a contract, the bill of lading, with the operator of the
vessel. The bill of lading provided that "no servant or agent of the
carrier (including every independent contractor from time to time
employed by the carrier) shall in any circumstances whatsoever be
under any liability.., for any loss or damage".43 When the purchaser
or consignee of the goods received them, it became apparent that
they had been damaged by the stevedores who had been hired by
the carrier to unload the vessel. Although the consignee conceded
that he was bound by the terms of the bill of lading with respect to
any claim against the carrier, the consignee sued the stevedores in
39. (1926), 36 B.C.R. 369 (C.A.).
40. Ibid, at p. 371.
41. See also Clarke v. The Earlof Dunraven, [1897] A.C. 59 (H.L.), affg [1895] P. 248 sub.
norm. the Satanita(C.A.).
42. [1975] A.C. 154 (P.C.) sub nom The Eurymedon.
43. Ibid., at p. 165.
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negligence and claimed that the stevedores could not rely, as thirdparty beneficiaries, on the provision of the bill of lading, which
appeared to be designed to protect them. The bill of lading further
stipulated, however, that with respect to this provision, the carrier
was acting as an agent on behalf of its servants or agents or any
independent contractors it might hire. The court held that the effect
of this provision was to constitute the carrier as an agent for the
purpose of communicating an offer of a unilateral contract to the
stevedores. In effect, the consignor and consignee offer an
agreement under which they promise that any independent contractors shall be entitled to the protections set out in the bill of lading,
which offer can be accepted by an independent contractor, as in this
case, by performing the act of unloading the vessel. A similar approach has been adopted in this same context by the Supreme Court
of Canada."
Although agency analysis may appear to offer a useful device
for avoiding application of the third-party beneficiary rule, there
are severe limitations on its utility. The application of agency
principles, in the normal case, rests on the finding of a genuine
intention to create a relationship of agency. Thus, strained applications of the agency concept such as that found in the New Zealand
Shipping case are vulnerable to the charge that the parties, in fact,
had no such intention. In New Zealand Shipping, for example,
Viscount Dilhorne dissented on the ground that the provision in
the bill of lading did not either expressly or impliedly contain any
such offer as that found by the majority. 45 Similarly, in the Dunlop
case,' the plaintiff tire manufacturer sought to ground relief on the
basis that the wholesaler had entered into contracts with the retailer
as an agent of the manufacturer. This argument was rejected, however, on the basis that the wholesaler had clearly bought the tires
from the manufacturer as a principal and there did not appear to be
any separate contractual undertaking negotiated by the wholesaler
as an agent of the manufacturer. Cases such as these indicate that
44. ITO-InternationalTerminal OperatorsLtd. v. Miida ElectronicsInc., [1986] 1 S.C.R.
752, 28 D.L.R. (4th) 641. See also Dyck v. Manitoba Snowmobile Association Inc.,
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 589, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 635 (release of association effective to preclude
tort claim in negligence against official for physical injuries). See D. Vaver, "Developments in Contract Law: The 1984-85 Term" (1986), 8 S.C.L. Rev. 109 at pp. 137-47.
45. See supra, footnote 42, at p. 170.
46. Supra, footnote 1.
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reliance on artificial extension of the agency analysis is a precarious
device for avoiding application of the third-party beneficiary rule.
2.

Trust

In contrast to the entrenchment of the third-party beneficiary
rule in the common law of contract, the courts of equity developed
the law of trusts under which the rights of third-party beneficiaries
were recognized. 47 Trust arises in circumstances where property is
being held by a person, the trustee, subject to an obligation to deal
with the property for the benefit of third persons, the beneficiaries
of the trust. A parent, for example, may transfer assets into the hands
of a trustee to be administered for the benefit of the children. The
law of trusts recognizes that the right to enforce a contractual obligation, a so-called "chose in action", is included among the kinds of
assets that can be made the subject-matter of a trust. Accordingly, if
a third-party beneficiary of a contract can successfully claim that
the promisee held the right to enforce the promise as a trustee for
the beneficiary, the beneficiary could enforce the promise on the
basis of the principles of the law of trusts. Although English and
Canadian courts have applied the trust analysis to third-party beneficiary cases, at least in the context of promises to pay money or to
transfer land,4" the modem authorities indicate that trust analysis
will apply only in circumstances where it is clear that the parties
actually intended to create a trust relationship. 9 In Vandepitte v.
Preferred Accident Insurance Co.,' for example, it was argued
that a provision in a father's car insurance policy which extended
indemnity protection to persons driving the car with permission was
held by the father in trust for the benefit of his daughter. The
argument was rejected on the basis that there was no evidence that
the father "had any intention to create a beneficial interest" for his
daughter specifically or as a member of a described class. 51
47. See generally E. Gillese, The Law of Trusts (Concord, Ont., Irwin Law, 1997) and
D.W.M. Waters, Law of Trusts in Canada (Toronto, Carswell, 1984).
48. See, for example, Lloyd's v. Harper,supra, footnote 2; Kendrick v. Barkey (1907), 9
O.W.R. 356 (H.C.J.) and Les Affriteurs Runis Socidtd Anonyme v. Leopold Walford
(London) Ltd., [1919] A.C. 801 (H.L.).
49. See Schebsman (Re), [1944] Ch. 83 (C.A.) and FournierVan & Storage Ltd. v. Fournier,
[1973] 3 O.R. 741, 38 D.L.R. (3d) 161 (H.C.J.).

50. [1933] A.C. 70 (P.C.).
51. Ibid. at p. 80. In Greenwood,the Supreme Court of Canada suggested that an important
test for the absence of trust is whether the parties to the contract could change its terms
"without reference to the alleged cestui que trust". See supra,footnote 18, at p. 240.
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As with agency law, then, extended application of the law of
trusts to third-party beneficiary contract cases is vulnerable to the
charge that no genuine intention to create such a relationship is
evident on the facts of the case. The role of trust law as a device for
circumventing the third-party beneficiary rule in contracts cases is
thus severely limited.
3. Collateral Contracts
As has been indicated, the distribution of manufacturer's goods
through dealers who purchase the goods from the manufacturer
and then sell the goods, in turn, to the consumer may give rise to
third-party beneficiary problems. The consumer may be a thirdparty beneficiary of a manufacturer's guaranty contained in the
contract of sale to the dealer. In some instances, the device of
collateral contract may enable the consumer to directly enforce the
manufacturer's undertaking. Such relief is likely limited, however,
to cases where the manufacturer has communicated with the consumer. In Shanklin PierLtd. v. Detel Products Ltd.,52 for example,
the defendant paint manufacturer had represented to the plaintiff
that its paint had certain qualities that rendered it appropriate for
use in repainting the plaintiffs pier. The plaintiff then required its
painting contractor to use the defendant's paint. The contractor then
purchased the paint from the defendant and applied it to the pier.
When the paint proved to be unsatisfactory, the plaintiff successfully
claimed damages from the manufacturer. Even though the contract
for the supply of the paint was between the manufacturer and the
contractor, the court held that there was a collateral unilateral contract offered by the manufacturer to the plaintiff. In effect, the
manufacturer was held to have offered to the plaintiff that it would
be bound by its representations concerning the quality of the paint
if the plaintiff instructed its contractor to use its paint on the project.
When the plaintiff did so, it accepted the manufacturer's offer and
gave the consideration that rendered the manufacturer's warranty
binding.

52. [1951] 2 K.B. 854. See also Wells (Merstham) Ltd. v. Buckland Sand and Silica Ltd.,
[1965] 2 Q.B. 170 and Murray v. Sperry Rand Corp. (1979), 23 O.R. (2d) 456, 96
D.L.R. (3d) 113 (H.C.J.).
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Similar unilateral contracts may be found where the advertising
material of manufacturers is read by consumers prior to the purchase of goods from an independent supplier.53 As the connection
between the manufacturer and the consumer becomes more tenuous,
however, the inference of contractual intentions of this kind appears
more artificial and, hence, unpredictable in application.
4.

Tort Law
In some cases, the breach of A's contractual duty to B may also
constitute a tort imposing compensable injuries upon C. C's tort
claim against A may thus appear as another device for avoiding
the third-party beneficiary rule. Thus, if A supplies a defective
product to B who, in turn, sells the item to C, A may be in breach
of the contract with B, but this will not avail C. If, however,
the defect results from negligence and causes physical injury or
property damage to C, a claim may be brought by C against A on
the basis of Donoghue v. Stevenson.' The development of tort
principles enabling recovery of economic loss expands the possible
scope of this solution to the third-party beneficiary problem." Recently, for example, the Supreme Court of Canada has held that the
builder of a defective building may be liable in tort to a subsequent
owner of the building for the economic loss involved in repairing
the defect, at least where the defect poses a foreseeable and substan-6
tial danger to the health and safety of the occupants of the building.
Although these tort duties relating to the supply of defective
goods and structures typically arise independently of the contractual duties imposed by the initial contract of supply, there are other
cases in which the tort duty owed to the third party appears to arise
directly from the breach of contract. In recent English cases, for
example, solicitors have been held liable to prospective beneficiaries for their failure to draw up a will57 or execute" it properly. Such
53. See Murray v. Sperry Rand Corp., ibid. (purchaser relies on manufacturer's sales
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

brochure) and Leitz v. Saskatoon Drug & Stationery Co. (1980), 4 Sask. R. 35, 112
D.L.R. (3d) 106 (Q.B.) (purchaser relies on advertising tag attached to product).
[1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.).
See generally B. Feldthusen, Economic Negligence: The Recovery of Pure Economic
Loss, 3rd ed. (Toronto, Carswell, 1994).
Winnipeg Condominium Corp. No. 36 v. Bird ConstructionCo., [1995] 1 S.C.R. 85, 121
D.L.R. (4th) 193.
White v. Jones, supra,footnote 3.
Ross v. Counters, [1980] Ch. 297.
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failures would constitute breach of contractual duties owed to their
clients that could not be enforced in a contract claim by the prospective beneficiaries because of the third-party beneficiary rule. Their
claim in tort, which avoids the third-party beneficiary rule, appears
to flow directly from the initial breach of contract.59
5. Assignment
The law concerning the assignment of contractual rights is a
complex subject that is beyond the scope of the present article.'
For present purposes, however, it is sufficient to note that contractual
rights are considered to be a species of property, so-called "choses
in action", which like other species of property can be transferred
from one person to another. The assignment of a contractual right
by an assignor to an assignee will be enforceable by the assignee
against the original promisor if the assignment complies with the
rules6' of common law, equity or statute relating to the effectiveness
of assignments. In the context of a contract in which the promisor
promises to confer benefits to a third-party beneficiary, then, if the
promisee were to assign the benefits of the contract to the thirdparty beneficiary in an effective manner, the third-party beneficiary
would be entitled to enforce the contract as an assignee.62
The possibility of assignment does not provide a general solution to the third-party beneficiary problem. Not all agreements are
59. See also JuniorBooks Ltd. v. Veitchi Co. Ltd., [1983] 1 A.C. 520 (H.L.) (factory owner

recovers cost of repairing or replacing defective flooring from flooring subcontractor).
For criticism, see D. Cohen, "Bleeding Hearts and Peeling Floors: Compensation for
Economic Loss at the House of Lords" (1984), 18 U.B.C. L. Rev. 289; J. Blom,
"Economic Loss: Curbs on the Way Ahead?" (1986-87), 12 C.B.L.J. 275 and J.G.

Fleming, The Law of Torts, 9th ed. (Sydney, Law Book, 1998), pp. 525-27.
60. See generally S.M. Waddams, The Law of Contracts,4th ed. (Aurora, Ont., Canada Law
Book, 1999), c. 8; and G.H.L. Fridman, The Law of Contracts in Canada, 4th ed.

(Toronto, Carswell, 1999), c. 17.
61. Although common law doctrine was inhospitable to assignment, equity permitted it.

Late 19th century legislation enacted in England and the Canadian provinces removed
some of the obstacles to its recognition. See, for example, Judicature Act, R.S.A. 1980,
c. J-I, s. 21(1) and Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.34,

s. 53(1).
62. As Professor Waddams has argued, the acceptance by the courts and the legislatures of
the principle of assignment appears quite inconsistent with the third-party beneficiary
rule. If parties can subsequently assign the right to enforce A's promise to B, what
objection can there be in principle to allowing C to enforce an initial agreement by the
parties to directly confer a benefit upon C. See Waddams, supra,footnote 60, at p. 194.
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capable of being assigned. Contracts involving a personal or service element, for example, cannot be assigned.63 In other cases,
assignment may be inconvenient or impractical. In a narrow range
of cases, however, an assignment of the promisee's rights to the
third-party beneficiary could provide a solution to the third-party
beneficiary problem.
6.

Statutory Exceptions

A number of statutory exceptions to the third-party beneficiary
rule have been enacted to in order to avoid unsatisfactory results.
A number have been found necessary in the insurance context.
Thus, the beneficiary under a life insurance policy has a statutory
right to enforce the policy.' In the context of motor vehicle insurance, an accident victim has a statutory right to claim directly against
the insurer of the person who caused the accident.65 Similarly, the
problem revealed by the decision in Vandepitte was remedied by
statute.' Examples from other contexts would include the statutory
right of a purchaser of goods being carried by sea to enforce the
contract of carriage (evidenced by a bill of lading) entered into by
the seller and the carrier,67 and the right of a mortgagee to sue the

assignee of the mortgagor who has promised the mortgagor that it
will make mortgage payments to the mortgagee.68 Some provinces
have enacted consumer protection statutes that enable consumers
to directly enforce manufacturers' or sellers' product warranties,
63. See Griffith v. Tower PublishingCo. Ltd. and Moncrieff, [1897] 1 Ch. 21 and Sullivan
v. Grey, [1942] O.W.N. 329 (H.C.J.).
64. See, for example, Insurance Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. 1-5, s. 264; Insurance Act, R.S.B.C.
1996, c. 226, s. 53; Insurance Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. 140, s. 172; Insurance Act, R.S.N.B.
1973, c. 1-12, s. 156; Insurance Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 231, s. 197; Insurance Act, R.S.O.

1990, c. 1.8, s. 195; and Saskatchewan Insurance Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. S-26, s. 157.
65. See, for example, Insurance Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. 1-5, s. 320(1); Insurance Act, R.S.B.C.
1996, c. 226, s. 159(1); Insurance Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. 140, s. 258(1); Insurance Act,
R.S.N.B. 1973, c. 1-12, s. 250(1); Insurance Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 231, s. 133(1); Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 1.8, s. 258(1); and Saskatchewan Insurance Act, R.S.S. 1978,
c. S-26, s. 210(1).

66. See, for example, Insurance Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. 1-5, s. 305; Insurance Act, R.S.B.C.
1996, c. 226, s. 172; Insurance Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. 140, s. 267(1); Insurance Act,
R.S.N.B. 1973, c. 1-12, s. 236; Insurance Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 231, s. 142; Insurance
Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 1.8, s. 244; and Saskatchewan Insurance Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. S-26,
s.219.
67. Mercantile Law Amendment Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.10, s. 7(1); Bills of Lading Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. B-6, s. 2 and Bills of Lading Act, R.S.N.S. 1968, C. 38, s. 2.

68. Mortgages Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.40, s. 20.
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whether or not the consumers are mere third-party beneficiaries of
the warranty in issue.69
7. Additional Exceptions at Common Law
(a) Provisions Limiting the Liability of Employees
The privity rule has given rise to particularly harsh results in the
context of limitation of liability clauses negotiated by employers
with their customers. Where harm to the customer results from the
careless conduct of employees, the employer may be immune from
liability but this immunity would not extend to employees because
they are merely third-party beneficiaries of the contract between
their employer and the customer. An analysis of this kind was
applied by the Supreme Court of Canada in Greenwood' in the
context of a lease taken out by a retailer. The lessor had agreed to
obtain fire insurance and not to seek compensation from the lessee
in the event of a fire occurring on the premises. Nonetheless, a claim
by the lessor directly against the lessee's employees who had caused
a fire enjoyed success.
This point was reconsidered by the court, however, in London
Drugs,7 and a new exception to the privity doctrine was crafted to
deal with this type of situation. In this case, the customer stored a
large transformer in a warehouse and agreed that the warehouseman's liability in the event of damage to the transformer would
be limited to $40. The plaintiff declined to exercise an option under
the storage contract to pay additional charges to effect an insurance
cover for damage to the transformer. When the transformer was
damaged as a result of the negligence of the warehouseman's employees, the plaintiff brought an action directly against them in tort.
Noting that "it would be absurd in the circumstances of this case
to let the appellant go around the limitation of liability clause by
suing the respondent employees in tort", the court concluded that
the concept of "warehouseman" in the agreement must be taken to
implicitly cover the employees of the warehouseman." The court
observed that in this context the parties understand that a warehouseman performs its contractual obligation through the actions of
69. Consumer Protection Act, S.S. 1978, c. 30.1, s. 55. Compare Consumer Product Warranty and Liability Act, S.N.B. 1978, c. C-1 8.1, ss. 23, 27(1).
70. Supra, footnote 18.
71. Supra, footnote 4.
72. Ibid, at p. 444.
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its employees. Where the customer has agreed to a limitation of
liability, the employees would not reasonably expect to be liable and
holding them so would lead to "serious injustice". 3 Thus, where a
limitation of liability clause negotiated by an employer either expressly or impliedly extends to cover the employees and where the
employees were performing the very services contracted for by the
customer in the ordinary course of their employment, the doctrine
of privity, in the court's view, should not apply.74 In these narrowly
defined circumstances, then, employees can rely on an exception to
the privity doctrine.
As noted above, however, the court declined to effect a broader
reform of the doctrine of privity on this occasion.75 Indeed, the
court merely distinguished rather than overruled Greenwood, on the
grounds that a lease is rather different from a contract to provide
services as it is not performed by the employees and that, in any
event, the contractual provisions in Greenwood were not intended
to confer protection on the employees.76 It may be considered unclear, then, what result would obtain if a lease explicitly either
identified as its purpose the running of a retail shop or imposed an
obligation on the lessee to do so. As we shall see, however, the court
returned to consider and, perhaps, expand the exception created
in London Drugs in a manner that might capture these kinds of
arrangements.77
(b) Insurance
Strict application of privity doctrine in the context of insurance
could work a hardship in many cases. Accordingly, insurance
contracts have been a fertile source of exceptions to the general
rule, both at common law and, as we have seen, in the statute
books. Two different fact patterns are typically found in the cases.
The first arises in the context of provisions that, in some fashion
or other, waive rights that an insurer would otherwise have to
73. lbid, at p. 446.
74. The potential implication that employees are protected where precisely providing such
services but not where committing "independent torts" is explored by M. Baer, supra,
footnote 4, at pp. 400-02. See also M.A.N.-B&W Diesel v. Kingsway Transports (1997),
33 O.R. (3d) 355, 99 O.A.C. 69 (C.A.).
75. See supra, the text at footnotes 33-36.

76. See supra, footnote 4, at p. 431.
77. See the discussion of FraserRiver Pile & Dredge Ltd. v. Can-Dive Services Ltd., in the
text, infra, at footnote 82.
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pursue claims against third parties. When the insurer, in breach of
such provisions, then pursues such relief, the third-party beneficiary will seek to rely on the waiver contained in the insurance
contract. The second type concerns insurance agreements, which
extend coverage to third parties who are not, in the formal sense,
parties to the agreement. The question arising in this context is
whether the third parties can enforce the positive obligation of the
insurer to provide coverage.
Waiver of Rights against Third Parties
Where a contract of insurance provides that the insurer shall
have no "recourse" against third parties, or where the insurer
waives a right to subrogate itself to the position of the insured for
purposes of bringing a claim against a third party, it is now clearly
established that such provisions are binding on the insurer. Thus,
if the insurer pursues an action against a third party protected by
such a provision, the third party may rely on the provision to defeat
the claim, notwithstanding the third party's lack of privity. In one
line of authority reaching back into the 19th century, insurers who
issued indemnity coverage to insureds "without recourse" were
held unable to bring an action against a party causing the loss who
was covered by the "without recourse" stipulation.78 The Supreme
Court of Canada reached a similar conclusion in the context of a
"builders' risk policy" in Commonwealth ConstructionCo. v. Imperial Oil Ltd.79 In that case, a builders' risk policy was taken out by
the owner of the project under construction. The policy covered not
only the owner but the contractors and subcontractors working on
the project. During the course of construction, the property was
damaged by a fire resulting from the negligence of a subcontractor.
Having indemnified the owner for its loss, the insurer then claimed
against the subcontractor. The Supreme Court rejected the claim on
two grounds. First, to permit the insurer to subrogate itself to the
owner in a claim against a subcontractor would be inconsistent
with the very purpose of the provision extending coverage to the
contractors and subcontractors. The point of the arrangement was to
spare the participants in the project "the necessity of fighting between themselves should an accident occur involving the possible
(i)

78. See Thomas & Co. v. Brown (1899), 4 Corn. Cas. 186; and J. Clark & Son Ltd. v.
Finnamore(1972), 5 N.B.R. (2d) 467,32 D.L.R. (3d) 236 (C.A.).

79. [1978] 1 S.C.R. 317, 69 D.L.R. (3d) 558.
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responsibility of one of them". Second, the court relied upon a
provision of the policy that explicitly permitted the insurer to bring
subrogated claims against non-insured parties. In the court's view,
this provision plainly precluded subrogation against insured parties
such as subcontractors. The third party could rely on this provision,
therefore, as a basis for dismissing the claim. A recent Ontario
decision has extended protection to the employees of a subcontractor
on the basis that they are implicitly protected by arrangements of
this kind.80
Although it has been suggested that the latter line of authority
rests on the particular nature of builders' risk insurance,8 the
Supreme Court has now clearly established that the principle that an
insurer's waiver of subrogation or recourse is binding as against
third-party beneficiaries is a principle of general application. In
Fraser River Pile & Dredge Ltd. v. Can-Dive Services Ltd.82 a
marine insurance policy contained a waiver of subrogation by the
insurer against "any charterer". The boat covered by the policy was
sunk as a result of the negligence of a charterer. Subsequently, the
owner of the boat and the insurer agreed to suspend the waiver of
subrogation clause and the insurer brought a subrogated claim
against the charterer. The charterer successfully defended the claim
on the basis that the exception to the doctrine of privity established
in London Drugs could extend to this fact situation. Understandably,
the plaintiff urged that the London Drugs exception would apply
only where the initial contract was for the supply of services and
where the parties would understand that the services could only be
supplied by employees or agents of the contractor. The Supreme
Court rejected so narrow a reading of London Drugs, however, and
held that the exception applies in any case in which the facts meet a
twofold test. First, it must be established that the third-party beneficiary was intended by the parties to the initial contract to be benefited by the contractual provision in question. Second, the "activities
performed by the third-party seeking to rely on the contractual
80. Madison Developments Ltd. v. Plan Electric Co. (1997), 36 O.R. (3d) 80, 152 D.L.R.
(4th) 653 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 157 D.L.R. (4th) vii, Il1 O.A.C.
199n, applying the reasoning in London Drugs, supra, footnote 4, in support of a
finding that the parties to the subcontract implicitly intended to extend protection to the

employees.
81. Ibid., at p. 661 D.L.R.; Sylvan Industries Ltd. v. FairviewSheet Metal Works Ltd. (1994),
89 B.C.L.R. (2d) 18, 113 D.L.R. (4th) 493 (C.A.).
82. Supra, footnote 13.
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provision [are] the very activities contemplated as coming within
the scope of the contract in general, or the provision in particular".
In the court's view, the FraserRiver facts passed these tests. The
first branch was met by the explicit reference to "charterers" as a
class in the initial agreement. The second branch of the test was met
on the basis that the agreement envisaged that the boat would be let
out to a charterer and that this is, in fact, what occurred. On the basis
of this decision, then, it is clear that the exception to the doctrine of
privity applicable to waivers of subrogation and similar provisions
applies generally within the context of insurance agreements and is
not limited to a particular class or type of policy.
(ii)

Coverage of Third Parties

It is commonplace for insurance policies to extend coverage not
only to the party who takes out the insurance but to other parties
who may be either named or at least identified by reference to a
category of covered persons. The question then arises as to whether
such third parties can enforce the insurance policy against the
insurer. A refusal to enforce such arrangements, of course, would
have the effect that insurance coverage that had been paid for
could not be effectively enforced by the third-party insureds. This
was the problem in Vandepitte,8 3 which held that the doctrine of
privity prevented third-party insureds from enforcing such provisions. Although, as noted above, the decision in Vandepitte was
abrogated by legislation in the context of automobile insurance, the
reasoning in Vandepitte created a potential hazard in other insurance
contexts. Nonetheless, Canadian courts appear to have adopted the
practice of ignoring Vandepitte. In a Nova Scotia case, for example,
the Appeal Division held that a mortgage-loss insurance policy taken
out by a chattel mortgagor, which was payable to the mortgagee,
could be enforced at the suit of the mortgagee.' Further, in Scott v.
Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Co.,5 the Supreme Court of Canada
83. Supra, footnote 50.
84. Trans Canada Credit Corp. v. Royal Insurance Co. of Canada (1983), 58 N.S.R. (2d)
280, 149 D.L.R. (3d) 280 (C.A.). Similarly, insurers who have issued indemnity cover-

age to insureds "without recourse" have been held unable to bring action against a party
causing the loss who is covered, albeit only as a third-party beneficiary, of the "without
recourse" stipulation. See Thomas & Co. v. Brown and J. Clark & Son Ltd. v. Finnamore,
both supra,footnote 78.
85. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1445, 59 D.L.R. (4th) 660.
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appeared to conclude that third-party insureds were effectively covered by an insurance policy even though the reasoning in Vandepitte
would suggest that this was not so. In the recent decision in Fraser
River, the Supreme Court confirmed that "it is time to put to rest the
unreasonable application of the doctrine of privity to contracts of
insurance established by the Privy Council in Vandepitte, a decision
characterized since its inception by both legislatures and the judiciary as out of touch with commercial reality".' With the effective
overruling of Vandepitte, then, a further exception to the privity
doctrine appears to permit the enforcement of insurance contracts
by third-party insureds.
A similar development has occurred in Australia. In Trident
GeneralInsurance Co. Ltd. v. McNiece Bros. Pty.Ltd.,87 the Australian High Court refused to apply the doctrine of privity in the
context of a third-party claim arising from a construction project at
a limestone crushing plant. The operator of the plant had taken
out liability insurance which included indemnification for itself, its
subsidiaries and related companies and all contractors and subcontractors at the plant. The principal contractor was held liable on a
claim by an injured worker. Though merely a third-party beneficiary
to the contract of insurance, it then successfully sought indemnification from the insurer. Two of the opinions' forming part of the
majority of the court offered criticism of the third-party beneficiary
rule and called for its reform. Nonetheless, the holding of the court
is grounded on the recognition of a specific exception to the rule
applicable to insurance contracts.
(c) The Open-Textured "Principled Exception"
In FraserRiver, the Supreme Court confirmed the existence of
a "principled exception" to the doctrine of privity that is not
restricted to a particular class or type of agreement. Although the
principled exception was first articulated in the decision in London
Drugs, the reasoning in that case was vulnerable to the interpretation that the exception only applied to a fact situation in which the
86. Supra, footnote 13, at pp. 273-74.
87. Supra, footnote 5.
88. Mason C.J. and Wilson in their joint opinion and Toohey J. favoured judicial reform of
the rule. Gaudron J., concurring in the result, preferred an unjust enrichment approach.
Deane J. favoured the trust approach but would have allowed further evidence and
submissions on the point. Brennan and Dawson JJ. dissented.
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initial contract concerned the provision of services and the parties
to that agreement would have appreciated that the services could
only be performed by servants or agents of the supplying party.
In such circumstances, the suppliers' employees were implicitly
protected by a limitation of liability provision in the initial supply
contract. This narrow reading of London Drugs appeared to be
reinforced by the court's narrow distinction of the previous holding
in Greenwood,89 in which a limitation of liability in a lease for retail
premises was held to offer no protection to the employees of the
lessee who negligently caused a fire. The Greenwood case was
distinguishable, it seemed, because the initial agreement was a lease,
not a service agreement, and the lessees' employees could therefore
not be said to be providing the very service envisaged in the initial
agreement. In this respect, the charterparty in FraserRiver appears
to be rather similar to the lease in Greenwood.
As we have seen, however, the court in FraserRiver held that
the London Drugs exception to the doctrine of privity was not
limited to provisions limiting liability under contracts for the supply of services. The principled exception to the doctrine, then, is
of general application and is available whenever the two branches
of the test set out in FraserRiver are met. The first branch requires
that the parties to the initial agreement intended to extend the
benefit in question to the third party.9 That intention may be ex-

plicit, as it was in FraserRiver, or implicit as it was in London
Drugs. The second and somewhat opaque branch of the test is that
the "very activities" of the third party come within the scope of the
initial contract or provision. In FraserRiver, the initial contract
referred to "any charterer". The defendant who, in fact, chartered
the boat in question was therefore engaged in the "very activity"
envisaged by the agreement. The general or open-textured nature of
the principled exception was emphasized by the court in Fraser
River. The purpose of the exception is to confer upon courts, in
cases where the traditional exceptions of agency and trust do not
apply, a discretion to "undertake the appropriate analysis, bounded
89. Supra, footnote 18.
90. As formulated in London Drugs and Fraser River, the test does not require that the

parties intend to confer a direct right to enforce on the third party; it is sufficient to
establish an intention-to-benefit. For discussion of this distinction supporting the intention-to-benefit approach on the ground that the parties are unlikely to think of the
question of direct enforcement, see Trident General, supra, footnote 5, at pp. 122-23
per Mason C.J. and Wilson J.
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by both common sense and commercial reality, in order to determine
whether the doctrine of privity with respect to third-party beneficiaries should be relaxed in the given circumstances". The principled
exception is thus not limited to a particular class or category of
contracts.
In attempting to determine the reach of the "principled exception", three issues arise. First, the content of the second branch of
the test requires examination. Second, it may be asked whether the
application of the exception is restricted to cases where third-party
beneficiaries rely upon a provision such as limitation of liability
clauses and waivers of subrogation in order to protect themselves
against claims being brought by the original promisor. Third, the
extent to which courts may be expected to apply the Greenwood
decision in future cases may be assessed.
The scope or content of the second branch of the test is not
easily discerned. Having found that the parties to the original
agreement intended to benefit the third party with the provision,
the second branch then requires that the third party be engaged in
the "very activity" envisaged by the agreement. It is not entirely
clear, however, what is contained in the second branch of the test
that is not contained in the initial requirement that the third party
be an intended beneficiary of the promise. In Fraser River, the
provision was intended to protect charterers. The defendant was a
charterer. Little is added to this analysis by the observation that
chartering was the very activity envisaged by the agreement. Further light on the second branch may be shed by examining the role
it plays in the London Drugs decision. Certainly it could be said
that the employees in London Drugs were engaged in the very
activity envisaged by the agreement, that is, providing storage
services. As the reasoning in London Drugs itself demonstrates,
however, the materiality of that fact appears to be that it supports
the inference that the parties must have implicitly intended to
extend protection to the employees, even though the agreement
does not explicitly so provide.9 In Fraser River, on the other
hand, where the agreement explicitly purports to confer a benefit on
"charterers", it is not surprising that the second branch of the test
appears to have no work to do. If this is correct, a better view of the
content of the second branch of the test is that it applies only in
cases where the third-party beneficiary is not explicitly referred to
91. Supra, footnote 4, at p. 452 per lacobucci J.
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in the agreement and it applies in support of an inference that the
agreement implicitly so provides.
The second issue is whether the principled exception could
apply to a case such as Beswick v. Beswick92 where the third-party
beneficiary, as plaintiff, brings a claim to enforce the promise or
whether, on the other hand, its application is restricted to cases like
London Drugs and FraserRiver where the third-party beneficiary,
as defendant, relies on a provision as protection against a claim
brought by the promisor. It is true that in both London Drugs and
FraserRiver, the court placed some emphasis on the nature of the
reliance being placed by the third-party beneficiary on the provision
in question and implicitly, one might argue, distinguished thereby
cases in which a third-party beneficiary, as plaintiff, seeks to enforce
a provision. Nonetheless, there are two considerations that weigh in
favour of the view that the principled exception could apply in both
types of cases. First, as a matter of precedent, the overruling of
Vandepitte in Fraser River offers support for the view that the
exception can so apply. Vandepitte was a case in which the thirdparty beneficiary, as plaintiff, sought to enforce a promise of insurance coverage given by the promisor insurer. FraserRiver plainly
intimates that such a claim would now lie in common law Canada.
Further, such a claim has been recently allowed by the Australian
High Court in the Trident GeneralInsurance Co. case.93 Second, if,
as the court states in FraserRiver, the purpose of the exception is to
withhold application of the privity doctrine in cases where considerations of "common sense and commercial reality" suggest that the
doctrine should be ignored, there appears to be no convincing basis
for assuming that such considerations could apply only in the context
of third-party reliance on limitations of liability or waiver of subrogation provisions. We should note in passing that the second branch
of the test, as formulated in FraserRiver, does not appear to apply
neatly to all cases in which third-party beneficiaries seek to enforce,
as plaintiffs, promises that are intended to benefit them. Although
the "insured" plaintiffs in Vandepitte94 and Trident95 may appear to
be engaged in the "very activity" envisaged by the agreement, i.e.
96
they suffered the defined loss or injury, the agreement in Beswick
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Supra,
Supra,
Supra,
Supra,
Supra,

footnote 2.
footnote 5.
footnote 50.
footnote 5.
footnote 2. The facts are set out in the text, supra, at footnote 28.
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does not envisage that the widow will engage in any particular
activity other than the receipt of money. This does not appear to be,
however, a satisfactory basis for proposing different results in these
cases. If, as suggested above, the true role of the second branch of
the exception is to determine whether or not the third party was an
intended beneficiary of the promise, this potential difficulty is made
to disappear.
Finally, the breadth of the principled exception suggests that the
vitality of the court's earlier decision in Greenwood has been
severely curtailed. Although the court declined to overrule Greenwood in London Drugs and neglected to mention the Greenwood
decision in FraserRiver, it may be that Greenwood should now
be considered to be restricted essentially to its own facts. Such an
approach was adopted in a recent decision of the Ontario Court of
Appeal in Tony and Jim's Holdings Limited v. Silva,97 a case in
which the court applied the principled exception in a fact situation
similar in its essentials to that of Greenwood. Like Greenwood, the
promise at issue in Tony and Jim's was contained in a lease in a
shopping mall. The lease provided that the landlord would procure
fire insurance, the premiums for which would be paid by the tenant.
The policy stipulated that "all rights of subrogation are hereby
waived against any corporation, firm, individual or other interest
with respect to which insurance is provided by this policy". A fire
occurred and the insurer brought a subrogated claim against an
officer of the insured corporation, alleging that the officer's negligence had caused the fire. The Court of Appeal refused to apply
Greenwood in the insurer's favour on the basis that Greenwood was
a case in which the court held that the defendant employees were
"strangers" to the contract. The question to be asked, after London
Drugs, in the court's view, was whether there existed sufficient
"identity of interest" between the officer and the corporation so as
to warrant application of the principled exception. Such an identity
of interest was established because the "parties must be taken to
have understood that the corporate tenant could only be guilty of
negligence through its directors or employees".9"
97. (1999), 170 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (Ont. C.A.). See also Laing Property Corp. v. All Seasons
Display Inc. (2000), 190 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 229 W.A.C. 203 (B.C.C.A.), distinguishing
Greenwood on the basis that the lessor in this case had contracted to provide certain
building management services in the lease.
98. Ibid, at p. 202.
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It is very difficult, however, to distinguish Greenwood on this
basis. The lease in Greenwood imposed an obligation on the landlord to procure fire insurance and not to grant subrogation rights
with respect to any loss caused by the tenant. Again, in Greenwood
it must have been obvious to the parties that the corporate tenant
could be careless only through the acts of employees. However,
the result in the Ontario case is more attractive than that in Greenwood and it may be likely, therefore, that Greenwood will continue
to be distinguished in the future as a case where the intention to
extend protection to third parties was not clearly established" and
that it will eventually be eclipsed by application of the principled
exception to fact situations of this kind.
IIl. Subsequent Variation or Annulment of the Promise
To the extent that third-party beneficiaries are able to enforce
promises against the promisor, consideration must be given to the
question of whether such enforceable promises can be subsequently varied or annulled either unilaterally by the promisor or
with the agreement of the promisee. Indeed, the possibility that
recognition of third-party beneficiary rights would complicate or
create obstacles to the exercise of variation or rescission of the
initial agreement is offered by some observers as a justification for
the traditional doctrine of privity.100 On the other hand, a unilateral
right to vary or rescind is capable of working injustice on third
parties who have relied on the provision to their detriment. The
United Kingdom legislation 1 that abrogates the privity doctrine
resolves this difficulty by restricting the ability of the parties to the
agreement to rescind or vary the agreement to the disadvantage of
the third party to situations where the third party had communicated
his assent to the arrangement to the promisor and where the promisor
is either aware that the third party has relied on the term or should
reasonably have foreseen that reliance. Thus, in any case where the
third party either has not agreed to the term or has not relied upon
it, the parties to the original agreement are free to vary or rescind its
99. A basis for distinguishing Greenwood on this ground is set out in London Drugs itself,
supra,footnote 4, at p. 431 per Iacobucci J. ("there was little, if any, evidence to support

a finding that the parties to the contract intended to confer a benefit on the employees").
100. See, e.g., G.H. Treitel, The Law of Contract, 10th ed. (London, Sweet & Maxwell,
1999), p. 545.
101. Supra,footnote 9, s. 2.
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terms. The New Brunswick statute" 2 adopts a different approach.
The original parties may amend or terminate their agreement at any
time, but the third party is protected with respect to any detrimental
reliance on the promise of which the promisor knew or ought to
have known.
Yet a third approach was taken by the Supreme Court of Canada
in the FraserRiver case. There the insurer and insured purported
to rescind the waiver of subrogation clause after the loss occurred
so as to enable the insurer to bring a subrogated claim against the
third-party beneficiary of the provision, the defendant charterer. In
the view of the Supreme Court, however, once the loss had occurred, the charterer's inchoate contractual right had "crystallized"
and the insurer and insured were no longer in a position to "revoke
unilaterally" the charterer's rights under the waiver of subrogation
clause. This approach differs from the U.K. legislative scheme in
two respects. First, crystallization of the third party's rights does
not appear to be contingent upon assent to or, indeed, awareness
of the original contractual term. This would appear to be the
preferable approach, at least in cases where the provision in question is the normal or usual one and, perhaps, in cases where the
third party is unlikely to make enquiries. Secondly, the position of
the charterer prior to crystallization may be less secure than it
would be under the U.K. scheme. The Supreme Court appears to
take the view that a unilateral revocation could occur prior to
crystallization even in a case where the charterer had assented to
the term and, perhaps, relied upon it by refraining from taking out
its own insurance. 03 Should this matter arise, the preferable view
would be that a third party who was aware of and detrimentally
relied on the existence of the provision would be protected by it
until, at the least, reasonable notice of a proposed variation or
rescission was given. Indeed, in a case where the arrangements in
place conferring benefits on third parties are the standard arrangements and where the third parties have simply assumed that the
standard arrangements are in place, it may be appropriate to dispense
with any requirement that the third party have actual notice of the
provision.
102. Supra, footnote 8, s. 4(3).
103. Such reliance, if foreseeable, would enable the third party to recover losses resulting

from amendment or termination of the contract under the New Brunswick scheme. See
ibid.
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C. THE CASE FOR (JUDICIAL) ABOLITION OF THE RULE
The doctrine of privity of contract is plainly unsatisfactory. A
number of considerations weigh in favour of wholesale abolition
of the doctrine. The doctrine is capable of producing unjust and
surprising results in commonplace fact situations. The rule lacks a
convincing rationale or policy justification. The doctrine has become remarkably unstable and unpredictable as a result of the
continuing growth of the list of exceptions to the general rule.
Indeed, the new "principled exception" to the rule appears to be
capable of unravelling the rule in its entirety. Further, the doctrine
has a distorting effect on other doctrines as artificial applications
of other rules are brought in aid of sensible results that can be
achieved only by finding a way around the privity doctrine.
A number of objections have been made to outright abolition.
Some worry that a doctrine favouring enforcement of contracts for
the benefit of third parties will be of uncertain ambit and that,
therefore, determining the proper treatment of such issues by the
current relatively stable doctrine will be replaced by use of one
that is unstable. Others may be concerned that the problems of
subsequent variation of the initial agreement and the applicability,
as against the third-party beneficiary, of defences available to the
initial contracting parties are so difficult that wholesale reform
should be resisted. Finally, there are those who, although they
favour abolition, feel that reform can or should only come from
the legislature. Abolition of the doctrine appears to represent so
dramatic a change in the common law that it should not be
achieved by judicial modification of the doctrine. I will briefly
elaborate on each of these points.
I. The Doctrine Produces Unjust Results
I will not belabour this point. One need only consider the claims
in Beswick v. Beswick' ° and Greenwood Shopping Plaza Ltd. v.
05
Neil J. Buchanan Ltd."
as illustrations of this phenomenon. In
Beswick, a nephew who purchased a business from his uncle promised, as part of the consideration for the sale, to pay, upon the uncle's
death, an annuity of £5 per week to his widow. When the uncle died,
the nephew refused to pay. The privity doctrine dictates the result
104. Supra, footnote 2.
105. Supra, footnote 18.
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that the nephew's claim is unenforceable at the instance of the
widow and the nephew is thereby able to avoid paying a significant
portion of the contract price. In the actual case, of course, the fact
that the widow was the executrix of her husband's estate saved the
situation and produced a more sensible result. She was able to bring
an action on behalf of the estate to enforce the nephew's promise,
thereby avoiding the obvious injustice that would otherwise result
from application of the rule. In Greenwood, a lessor who promised
the lessee that it would take out fire insurance and hold the lessee's
employees harmless in the event of a fire nonetheless brought a
successful claim against the lessee's individual employees whose
negligence had caused a loss. The doctrine of privity precluded
the employees from relying on the contractual stipulation that was
designed to protect them. Under traditional doctrine, this result
would be dictated by the rule whether or not either the lessee or the
employees had relied upon the provision by refraining to take out
further insurance. The apparent injustice of this result was, no doubt,
a good part of the inspiration for the new "principled exception" to
the doctrine developed in London Drugs06 and Fraser River,07
which may now provide a basis for the opposite result in fact
situations of this kind. Moreover, it should not be thought that privity
problems arise in only marginal or uncommon factual settings. In
the introductory section of this article, I attempted to identify a
number of garden-variety commercial settings in which privity problems arise. The hazards created by privity doctrine in the context,
for example, of insurance agreements and of construction projects
are notorious.'
II. Lack of a Convincing Rationale
As has been suggested above,"°9 the traditional justifications for
the privity rule appear unconvincing. These explanations of the
doctrine are that the doctrine of consideration dictates this result the third party beneficiary has not given consideration for the promise - and, alternatively, that the third party beneficiary, not being a
"party" to the agreement, should not be able to enforce it. The
suggestion that the privity doctrine is grounded in consideration
106. Supra, footnote 4.
107. Supra, footnote 13.
108. See, generally, Law Commission, supra, footnote 6, pp. 43-50.
109. Supra, the text at footnotes 23-25.
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theory is unpersuasive. The point of consideration doctrine is to
identify promisors who should be held to their promises. A promisor
who has received consideration in return for the promise, according
to consideration theory, should be bound by the promise. The
nephew in Beswick and the lessor in Greenwood have received
consideration. It is therefore no offence to consideration theory to
suggest that they should be bound by their promises. Consideration,
per se, does not tell us the answer to the severable question as to
whether the widowed aunt should be able to bring an action to
enforce the promise."l
The suggestion that a third party beneficiary is not truly a
"party" to the agreement may be simply a restatement of the
consideration point. If so, it collapses for the same reason. To the
extent that it is a different point, it appears to be a circular argument
resting simply on the definition of the term "party".
It is sometimes suggested that an additional rationale for the
privity doctrine may be found in the proposition that the common
law does not confer upon a mere donee of a promise a right
to enforce the promise."' Gratuitous promises are unenforceable.
Accordingly, the third party beneficiary, who may in some sense be
a donee, should not be able to enforce. Like the consideration point,
this too is a non sequitur. The principal reason for not enforcing
gratuitous promises is to protect the interests of the donor promisor
who might be surprised by the imposition of such liability." 2 The
promisors in Beswick and Greenwood should expect their promises
to be binding, as they were given for good consideration.
The practical effect of the privity doctrine is to render promises
unenforceable at the instance of the party who may be the only
person with an interest in enforcing them. In such cases, the result
is that a legally binding promise is, in practical terms, simply
unenforceable. And yet, there appears to be little reason for isolating contracts for the benefit of third parties from the common
law's general policy of enforcing promises that are intended to be
110. The traditional defence of privity on consideration grounds is not strengthened, in my
view, by the assertion that consideration requires "correlativity" or "mutuality of
exchange" and that this is why third parties cannot enforce. See, e.g., J. Brock, "A
Principled Exception to Privity of Contract" (2000), 58 U. of T. Fac. L. Rev. 53 at
p. 70. Such assertions appear to be merely assertions - ipse dixits - rather than
explanations or justifications in policy terms for the conclusion that a third party
beneficiary cannot enforce.
111. See Treitel, supra,footnote 100, at p. 545.
112. See, generally, L. Fuller, "Consideration and Form" (1941), 41 Col. L. Rev. 799.
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legally binding. Indeed, the reasons for enforcing promises for the
benefit of the third parties appear to be consistent with the reasons
for enforcing promises more generally. Failure to facilitate the
enforcement of such promises may lead to the unjust enrichment
of the promisor and to the disappointment of the expectations of
persons who have relied on them." 3
III.

Unstable and Arbitrary Doctrine

The common law prides itself on its capacity for self-renewal
through judicial modification of unsatisfactory doctrine. One signal that a particular doctrine is ripe for reform and restatement is
the accretion of a series of exceptions to the general rule which
render application of that rule unpredictable - indeed, arbitrary
and capricious. The doctrine of privity appears to have reached
this advanced state of decay. As we have seen, the traditional
exceptions of trust and agency appear to be doctrines that are
capable of manipulation in aid of subverting the application of the
general rule. The application of agency principles in cases like in
New Zealand Shipping"4 and ITO-InternationalTerninal Operators 5 are impressively muscular. At the same time, it is difficult to
predict whether a similarly aggressive approach will be taken in
other contexts. The uncertain availability of trust analysis offers a
further source of instability.
The new "principled exception" to privity doctrine gives rise to
similar concerns. As has been suggested above, the outer limits of
that exception are not easily discerned. Indeed, if the exception
will apply, as it may, in any case where "both common sense and
commercial reality" suggest that the privity doctrine should be
ignored, the exception appears to carry the inherent capacity to
completely overwhelm the traditional principle. At the very least,
the "principled exception", at its present stage of development,
lends itself to artificial distinctions. It is not clear, for example,
how one is to explain the difference in result between Greenwood..6 and Fraser River."' Moreover, although the overruling of
113. See, generally, L. Fuller and W. Perdue, 'The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages"
(1936), 46 Yale L.J. 52 and 373.
114. Supra, footnote 42.
115. Supra, footnote 44.
116. Supra, footnote 18. And see the discussion in the text at footnotes 97-99.
117. Supra, footnote 13.
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VandepitteI ' suggests that the principled exception will extend to
cases in which the promisee seeks damages for breach of promise
against the promisor, the full sweep of the doctrine will not become
clear until it is tested in further litigation.
In short, then, both the traditional exceptions and the new principled exception contribute to the creation of a body of doctrine that
is very subtle and, accordingly, unpredictable in its application.
IV. Distorting Effect on Other Doctrine
Unsatisfactory doctrine is likely to effect two different kinds of
distortions of other doctrines. First, to the extent that the unsatisfactory doctrine creates an obstacle to a just result, pressure is
likely to be placed on other doctrines to expand or contract artificially in order to provide a means to a just resolution of the dispute.
Second, the unsatisfactory doctrine may perform the role, in a
particular case, of providing a convenient excuse for reaching a
fair result that might be difficult to achieve through the application
of the doctrine that is more relevant to the resolution of the particular dispute. Explication of the relevant doctrine might produce
better doctrine in the sense that the issue will be resolved both
more soundly and more generally. Both types of distortions are
apparent in the jurisprudence of the privity doctrine.
The trust and agency exceptions to the traditional rule are perhaps the best illustration of the first type of distortion. Thus,
for example, the agency relationship identified in cases like New
2 is
ZealandShipping"9 and ITO-InternationalTerminal Operators"
not likely to have occurred to the minds of the natural persons who
2
are alleged to be both principals and agents in these fact situations.1 '
However, the distorting effect of privity doctrine is likely to extend
beyond the areas of law affected by the traditional exceptions. Thus,
for example, the Greenwood problem has been resolved in some
cases by holding, somewhat controversially, that the unenforceable
118. Supra, footnote 50. And see the discussion in the text at footnotes 92-96.
119. Supra, footnote 42.
120. Supra,footnote 44.
121. The artificiality of the consideration analysis in these cases (the stevedores, hired by

the consignee, provide consideration to the consignor by unloading the vessel) has
been commented on by Lord Goff in The Makhutai, [1996] 3 W.L.R. 1 (P.C.) at pp. 1112. Cf. Hazmasters Environmental Equipment Inc. v. London Guarantee (1998), 171
D.L.R. (4th) 93, 171 N.S.R. (2d) 176 (C.A.) (arguably creative application of consider-

ation doctrine in a three-party situation).
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limitation of liability stipulation nonetheless has the effect of negativing the defendant's duty of care in tort.'2
The second type of distortion - avoiding the central issue in
the case - can be illustrated by the Dunlop case itself. In Dunlop,
the effect of applying privity doctrine was to strike down a retail
price maintenance scheme. The true justification for refusing enforcement, as Lord Denning later observed, may be that the thirdparty beneficiary, on these facts, has no legitimate interest to
enforce since it is "seeking to enforce the maintenance of prices to
the public disadvantage". 23 The real question in Dunlop, one might
argue, is whether such schemes ought to be considered contrary to
public policy and therefore unenforceable. The court was able avoid
this important and difficult question by relying on privity doctrine.
Similarly, the privity doctrine seems to have been relied upon in
a recent Ontario case as a device for avoiding a difficult issue. In
Van Patter v. Tillsonburg DistrictMemorial Hospital,24 the plaintiff, a passenger in a motor vehicle, was severely injured in a motor
vehicle accident. Her claim against the owner and driver of the
vehicle was settled and she signed a standard release in which she
agreed not to bring a claim against any other person who might seek
contribution or indemnity from the owner and driver. Some time
later, she discovered that she had suffered a broken neck in the
accident. She then brought a claim against the physicians who had
treated her after the accident. The physicians relied upon the release
as third party beneficiaries and moved to dismiss the claim. However, the Court of Appeal relied on the doctrine of privity to hold
that the physicians, as third-party beneficiaries, could not rely on
the provision in the release.
For some, this will appear to be the just result. However, the
real issue in the case, I would suggest, is whether the mutual
mistake made by the parties with respect to the extent of the
victim's injuries constitutes a basis for setting aside the release or,
alternatively, whether the release is an unconscionable arrangement or, in the further alternative, whether on its proper interpretation, the provision in the release extends to these particular
circumstances. If, on a careful examination, the doctrine of mistake
122. Norwich City Council v. Harvey, [1989] 1 W.L.R. 828; Southern Water Authority v.
Carey, [1985] 2All E.R. 1077. And see Law Commission, supra, footnote 6, at pp. 2022.
123. Beswick, supra, footnote 28, at p. 557.
124. (1999), 45 O.R. (3d) 223, 122 O.A.C. 80 (C.A.).
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is unavailing, the agreement appears to be a fair one and, correctly
interpreted, applies to these facts, it is not obvious that the just
result is to permit the claim. If, on the other hand, the result of the
case is appropriate because it is justifiable on grounds of mistake,
unconscionability or proper interpretation, it is unfortunate that the
matter has been resolved on the basis of privity doctrine. If, say,
the doctrine of mistaken assumptions properly applies to these
facts, it ought to apply both as against the physicians and as against
the owner and driver. In other words, the true issue in the case
appears to be the possible effect of a changed appreciation of the
nature of an injury on a settlement agreement of this kind. The fact
that there is a third-party beneficiary is, arguably, incidental and
not material to the true issue in dispute. If, for various reasons, the
release should not be binding in these altered circumstances, the
doctrine that renders the release unenforceable should be applicable in cases where privity is not an issue. Reliance on the privity
point, then, thus appears to have distracted the court from facing
what is, arguably, the central issue raised by the case.
Moreover, it is not clear that the privity analysis in the Van
Pattercase can survive scrutiny under the "principled exception"
from FraserRiver. One is tempted to predict, however, that the
"principled exception" will be applied in a case where a court
thinks that, for other reasons, enforcement of the promise brings a
just outcome and not applied in other cases where this is not so.
Thus, one might argue that the principled exception does not apply
to the facts of Van Patterbecause "common sense and commercial
reality" do not so dictate. And yet, the issue in FraserRiver with
respect to the exemption clause is very similar to that in Van
Patter.
In summary, then, the unsatisfactory state of the privity doctrine
appears to have a distorting effect on other doctrines on the one
hand by creating pressure on other doctrines to adjust in order to
counteract the effects of the privity rule, and on the other hand by
providing a convenient excuse to deny enforcement of a promise
where the question of its enforceability ought more truly to rest on
other kinds of considerations.
V.

Abrogating the Rule Leads to Uncertainty

One of the possible objections to simply abolishing the doctrine
of privity is that this would leave the law in an uncertain state as
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to the extent to which contracts to benefit third parties might be
enforceable. Would every conceivable third-party beneficiary be
able to enforce the agreement? If not, how would one craft a rule
that would restrict enforceability to third-party beneficiaries who
are, in some sense, the appropriate beneficiaries of such a doctrine?
There are two answers to this objection, in my view. First, the
comparative experience of other jurisdictions surely provides some
comfort on this point. Thus, even in common law jurisdictions,
such as the United States, in which the privity doctrine is not
followed, this does not appear to have been an unsolvable problem.
Moreover, the general privity rule knows no parallel in civilian
jurisdictions. I am not aware of any evidence to suggest that jurists
in the United States or in civil law countries have articulated a
concern with respect to the alleged uncertainties resulting from the
lack of a privity doctrine. Nor am I aware of any movement in
these jurisdictions to adopt the traditional common law rule.
Secondly, to the extent that this anxiety about uncertainty results
from a concern that no reasonable limit can be drawn around
promises to benefit third parties that should be enforceable, a
number of possibilities are suggested by experience elsewhere.
Enforceability could be limited to promises that are explicitly
intended to confer benefits on third parties or, I5 more restrictively,
on promises that are explicitly intended to confer direct rights of
action upon third parties to enforce the promises in question. As we
have seen, the Supreme Court of Canada,"2 in developing the new
"principled exception" to the rule, appears to be of the view that
parties who are implicitly intended to benefit from a provision
should be protected by the principled exception. As a further alternative, then, a new rule which simply abrogated the existing privity
doctrine could be similarly so limited. By these or other means,'27
the new general rule of enforceability could be crafted in such a way
that it would not extend to every conceivable person who might
directly or indirectly benefit from the performance of an agreement
between two other parties.
125. This is the approach taken in both the New Brunswick and the U.K. legislation. See
footnotes 8 and 9.
126. London Drugs, supra, footnote 4.
127. See, e.g. American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Contracts 2d (St. Paul,

Minn., ALI, 1981) 302(1) (the third party can enforce "if recognition of a right to
performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties").
But see, Eisenberg, supra, footnote 10, at pp. 1412-29.
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VI. Subsequent Variation or Annulment
As noted above, one of the possible objections to simple abolition of the doctrine is the alleged difficulty of determining the
effect of abolition on the ability of the parties to the original
agreement to vary or annul subsequently their agreement. Again,
28
there are two responses to this objection. First, as FraserRiver'
itself demonstrates, this problem is unavoidable even if the courts
persist in merely recognizing new exceptions to the privity doctrine
rather than effecting its outright abolition. In FraserRiver, it will be
recalled, the parties to the original agreement sought to rescind the
provision protecting the third party after the loss had occurred. The
Supreme Court refused to give effect to their attempted rescission
on the basis that the rights of the third party had "crystallized".
Thus, the problem of subsequent variation or annulment requires a
solution even if the traditional rule is retained. More exceptions give
rise to the same difficulty.
The second response again draws from FraserRiver. That case
may be taken to demonstrate that the problem of subsequent variation or annulment is amenable to a sensible solution. As we have
seen, the specific solution adopted in FraserRiver itself is not
precisely the same as the solutions adopted in the recent New
Brunswick 29 and U.K 30 legislation. For present purposes, it is not
necessary to choose among these particular solutions. The point,
rather, is that the need to find a solution to the problem of subsequent
variation or annulment is not a convincing reason for refusing to
abolish the general rule.
VII. Availability of Defences
A further and similar possible objection to abolition of the
doctrine is an alleged difficulty in determining the impact of such
a change on the availability of any defences, set-offs and counterclaims that the promisor might have had against the other party to
the initial agreement.' 3 ' That is to say, there is a concern that it
might be difficult to determine what the effect would be, in a claim
brought by the third party, of the fact that the promisor might have
128.
129.
130.
131.

Supra, footnote 13.
Supra, footnote 8, s. 4(3).
Supra, footnote 9, s. 2. And see the discussion in the text at footnotes 100-02.
See Treitel, supra,footnote 100, at p. 545.
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had a defence of some kind to a claim brought by the promisee.
Obviously, for example, if the contract is unenforceable against
the promisor on such grounds as lack of consideration, failure of
formation, non-occurrence of a condition, and so on, it would appear
unjust if the third party were able to ignore such problems and bring
a successful action to enforce against the promisor. On the other
hand, it may be asked whether the third-party's claim should be
subject to any conceivable set-off or counterclaim available to the
promisor as against the promisee, even though the set-off or counterclaim relates to some other transaction between the two parties to
the original agreement.'32
Again, the comparative experience should provide comfort on
this point. One possible solution is to suggest that only issues that
undermine the enforceability of the original contract should be
available as against the third party. This is essentially the American
rule. 3 3 The New Brunswick Act adopts a similar approach."t ' Another possibility would be to make more broadly available to the
promisor any set-offs or counterclaims relating to the initial transaction. This is the solution adopted in the United Kingdom 35 and
New Zealand legislation.'36 Again, the important point for present
purposes is not whether one of these two solutions is to be preferred.
Rather, the point is that either of these solutions appear to be attractive possibilities, and accordingly the alleged difficulty of providing
a solution to this problem does not constitute a compelling objection
to abolition of the doctrine.
VIII.

By Legislation or By Common Law Methodology?

Finally, among those who favour abolition of the common law
doctrine, there are those who feel that so significant a shift in
common law doctrine can be achieved only by legislative enactment. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada itself has taken this
position with respect to the privity doctrine. As noted above, in
London Drugs, the court rehearsed the many criticisms that have
132. See, generally, Law Commission, supra, footnote 6, at pp. 115-23.
133. See Eisenberg, supra, footnote 10.
134. Supra, footnote 8, s. 4(2) ("any defence may be raised that could have been raised in

proceedings between the parties").
135. Supra, footnote 9, s. 3.
136. The Contracts (Privity) Act 1982, S.N.Z. c. 132, s. 9(2).
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been made of the doctrine but then went on to observe that "[w]ithout doubt, major reforms to the rule denying third parties the right
to enforce contractual provisions made for their benefit must come
from the legislature".' Further, the court observed that "privity of
contract is an established principle in the law of contracts and should
not be discarded lightly. Simply to abolish the doctrine of privity or
to ignore it, without more, would represent a major change to the
common law involving complex and uncertain ramifications. This
Court has in the past indicated an unwillingness to sanction judgemade changes of this magnitude ....138Having thus rejected the
possibility of abolition of the doctrine, however, the court went on
to craft a new exception to the doctrine applicable to the circumstances of this case. In FraserRiver, as we have seen, the court then
generalized the nature of this "principled exception" in such fashion
as to create a rather powerful exception to the doctrine. Further, as
noted above, the court explicitly overruled the Vandepitte decision
in FraserRiver, thus indicating that the principled exception can
apply to claims brought by third parties against promisors to enforce
their promises.
In considering whether legislative or judicial abolition of privity
doctrine is the more appropriate vehicle of reform, a number of
considerations may be brought to bear. First, we should note that
the model of doctrinal reform endorsed by the Supreme Court in
London Drugs and Fraser River may not correspond to current

political realities in common law Canada. This model of legislative
reform implicitly assumes that provincial legislatures, either upon
the polite hint of the judiciary or upon the recommendations of a
provincial law reform commission, will take an interest in enacting
legislative modifications of the private law of obligations. This
expectation no longer corresponds to the dynamics of provincial
politics. Indeed, it may be wondered how realistic or effective this
model has been in the past. We may note that legislative reform of
privity doctrine in the United Kingdom was effected only some 60
years after it was initially proposed. 39 Nonetheless, it may be
answered that both the New Brunswick legislature and the U.K.
Parliament did deal with the matter and that this, arguably, is a
preferable approach. It is legitimate to question, however, the extent
137. Supra, footnote 4, at pp. 436-37.
138. Ibid., at p. 437.
139. See the text at footntes 36-37.
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to which the other Canadian provincial legislatures may be counted
on to address issues of this kind. The evidence of recent decades
suggests a lack of interest in law reform of this kind." Moreover,
legislative reform in common law Canada may be a less attractive
option than it is in the United Kingdom, as here the involvement of
many provincial legislatures would be required to effect comprehensive change. Although the call for legislative activity made by the
court implicitly in London Drugs has been responded to by New
Brunswick, 4' it seems unlikely that all or even some of the other
provinces will follow suit. The optimal outcome is likely to be a
patchwork of reform across the country. It is not obvious that a
patchwork reform is preferable to persistence of the status quo
which, apart from New Brunswick, is at least uniform across the
other common law provinces.
If, for reasons such as these, abolition of the doctrine by provincial legislatures appears an unlikely prospect, it nonetheless will
seem problematic for some observers that abolition should be
effected at common law. Here we confront, of course, the forgivable schizophrenia of the common law on the issue of judicial
modification of unsatisfactory doctrine. On the one hand, common
lawyers take pride in the ability of the common law to purify itself
and expel unsatisfactory doctrine from its body. Some see this,
however unrealistically, as a significant difference from or advantage over the law of code-bound civilian jurisdictions. On the other
hand, of course, both the profession and the citizenry have a
compelling interest in the stability of doctrine. A vigorous approach to reforming the law through judicial modification of the
doctrine creates risks for those who plan their affairs on the basis
of existing doctrine and complicates the professional tasks of rendering legal advice and resolving disputes. The problem of resolving this tension between stability and change is, of course, a topic
of central importance for adjudication generally and for common
law methodology in particular. Fortunately, it is, I would suggest,
not necessary to resolve this tension in any absolute sense in order
to adequately address the question of whether abolition of the
doctrine of privity should be considered to come comfortably
140. It is difficult to identify recent instances of legislative reform of basic private law
doctrine. The law reform commissions in British Columbia, Manitoba and Ontario
were disbanded in the mid-1990s.
141. Supra, footnote 8.
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within the category of doctrinal reform that can be appropriately
undertaken by the common law method.
Three considerations may be offered in support of the view that
privity doctrine is an appropriate subject for judicial reform and
abolition. First, and at the risk of some over-simplification, the
principal rationale for stability of doctrine relates to the ability of
individuals and their lawyers to plan their affairs and resolve
conflicts. The high level of instability of current privity doctrine
suggests that it does not perform either of these functions very
satisfactorily at the present time. Moreover, we may note that the
claims of those who wish to rely on the traditional rule are less
than completely attractive. Consider, for example, the nephew in
Beswick. We would not seriously be moved by an argument from
the nephew that in promising his uncle to pay an annuity after the
uncle's death to his widowed aunt, the nephew was relying on
privity doctrine for the conclusion that the promise would not, in
any event, be enforceable on her motion. Indeed, the nephew's
position would appear dishonourable. Thus, whatever claim the
planning function of private law would normally hold against
reform of a private law doctrine appears to be substantially diminished, if not obliterated, in the context of the privity doctrine. The
effect of the reform would be to hold parties to promises made, we
may assume, with serious intent and within the four comers of
otherwise enforceable agreements. It would not be dishonourable
or intolerable, of course, to give legal advice or attempt to resolve
disputes on the basis of traditional privity doctrine. On this point,
the argument for reform must rest on the current inability of the
doctrine to provide a confident basis for prediction.
Secondly, in attempting to tease out the appropriate role for
judicial as opposed to legislative reform of private law doctrine, it
may be appropriate to examine more carefully the nature of the
proposed reform in the light of the more general responsibility of
the judicial system to articulate coherent doctrine and to seek to
achieve the noble ambition of deciding like cases in like fashion.
If, as appears to be the case with privity doctrine, the doctrine has
become sufficiently incoherent that it creates an obstacle to this
objective, it appears doubtful that abdication of responsibility for
reform to the legislature is an appropriate solution. Although the
responsibility of the judiciary for the reform of private law doctrine
is neither exclusive nor ultimate, as it is always subject to the
legislative trump, neither is it non-existent in the common law

214

Canadian Business Law Journal

[Vol. 35

tradition. As Chief Justice Mason observed in his reasons in Trident General Insurance: "it is the responsibility of this Court to
reconsider in appropriate cases42 common law rules which operate
unsatisfactorily and unjustly".
Finally, it may be asked whether abolition of the general rule is,
as the court suggested in London Drugs, such a "major" reform
with "complex and uncertain ramifications" that it should not be
contemplated by the courts. Some consideration may be given to
the nature of the proposed reform in social, political and economic
terms. Although predictions with respect to such matters are, of
course, difficult, comparative experience again provides some
comfort. More particularly, there appears little reason to believe
that the absence of traditional privity doctrine in the contract law
of the United States has had particularly negative or noticeable
effects in these spheres. As far as the ramifications for contract
doctrine are concerned, we may question whether the impact of
abolition of the rule should now be considered a "major" change.
If, as has been argued here, the exceptions threaten to overwhelm
the general rule, the abolition of the general rule moves away from
the category of radical reform in the direction of modest reform
or, indeed, needed clarification. One may, in any event, question
the appropriateness, in the light of the considerations identified
above, of a general judicial refusal to engage in what may even be
considered significant or major reform of technical aspects of the
private law of obligations which appear to "operate unsatisfactorily
and unjustly".
D.

CONCLUSION

The doctrine of privity of contract was described by the U.K.
Law Revision Committee in the mid-1930s as "uncertain and
confused". The doctrine has not improved with age. This article
has argued that the lengthening list of exceptions to the general
rule has created a subtle and needlessly complex doctrine that is
ripe for judicial reform. The appropriate reform, it has been suggested here, would be to simply recognize that the general principle
has been overwhelmed by its exceptions and that it no longer
142. Supra, footnote 5, at p. 123, in a joint opinion with Wilson J. favouring direct overrul-

ing of the privity doctrine. And see R. v. Salituro, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654 at pp. 669-80,
50 O.A.C. 125 per Iacobucci J. See, generally, M. Eisenberg, The Nature of the
Common Law (Cambridge, Harvard U.P., 1988), esp. c. 7.
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survives. Although the doctrine appears to have a continuing capacity to effect unjust results, it may well be that the exceptions to
the rule and, more particularly, the new "principled exception",
developed by the Supreme Court of Canada in the London Drugs
and FraserRiver decisions, has the capacity to avoid application
of the general rule in any case where its application would effect
an unjust result. If this is so, it may simply be misleading to persist
in the belief that the general rule against enforceability survives.
The reluctance of the Supreme Court to engage in substantial
modification of private law doctrine is understandable. It may be,
however, that a tendency to err on the side of stable doctrine at the
expense of needed reform is exacerbated with respect to the present
topic by the fact that the general principle was reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court itself as recently as 1980 in the Greenwood case.
Nonetheless, the inadequacy of the Greenwood decision seems
readily apparent. Indeed, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion,
suggested above, that the decision has been effectively overruled
by the decision of the court in FraserRiver.
The doctrine of privity of contract bears a number of striking
similarities to the traditional rule that moneys paid under a mistake
of law are irrecoverable. As with privity doctrine, many observers
noted that the mistake of law doctrine produced harsh results,
generated a lengthy list of exceptions that threatened to overwhelm
the general principle, was the subject of persistent and vigorous
criticism in the law reviews and in law reform commission reports
and was overruled by statute in a number of jurisdictions. Further,
it could plausibly be said that abolition of the mistake of law rule
consisted a "major" reform of the common law.'43 Nonetheless, in

recent years, the doctrine was simply abolished by the Supreme

Court of Canada'" and, more recently, by the House of Lords. 45 The

doctrine of privity of contract deserves a similar fate.

143. A characterization adopted by Lord Goff in Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Lincoln City
Council, [1998] 4 All E.R. 513.
144. See Air Canada v. British Columbia (1989), 59 D.L.R. (4th) 161, [1989] 1 S.C.R.
1161; CanadianPacificAirlines Ltd. v. British Columbia (1989), 59 D.L.R. (4th) 218,
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 1133, supp. reasons [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1067, 63 D.L.R. (4th) 768; Air
Canada v. Ontario (Liquor Control Board) (1997), 148 D.L.R. (4th) 193, [1997] 2

S.C.R. 581.
145. See Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Lincoln County Council, supra, footnote 143.

